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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PAULA K. FISHER, 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
-vs- Case No. 
MARY C. CORPORON, Priority No. 
Defendant/Appellee. 
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE (hereinafter, "defendant") submits the following as 
defendant's brief in the above-entitled matter: 
JURISDICTION 
This Court putatively has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.. §78-2-
2(3)0); Utah Code Ann.. §78-2-2(4) and Utah Code Ann.. §78-2a-3(2)(k). 
However, this Court lacks jurisdiction in the above-entitled appeal for the following 
reasons: 
a. The appeal has been untimely filed. The summary judgment which is the 
basis of this appeal was entered by the trial court on February 2, 1996. The notice of 
appeal was due to be filed, if at all, by March 4, 1996. (Rule 4(a), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure.) It was actually filed March 5, 1996. (A true and correct copy of 
the notice of appeal in question is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.) 
Because the appeal is untimely, this Court has no jurisdiction to proceed in this matter; 
and 
b. The plaintiff failed to pay the filing fee and cost bond on appeal in this 
matter, claiming that she was impecunious. The defendant has asserted, and continues 
to assert, that the plaintiff has financial resources available to her, including real estate 
and wages, and that it is improper for her to proceed impecuniously in this case. Her 
failure to pay the filing fee and cost bond on appeal, as required by law deprives this 
Court of jurisdiction in this matter. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
ISSUE: DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT? 
The only proper issue on appeal in this case is whether the trial court erred in dismissing 
the plaintiffs complaint against defendant upon defendant's motion for summary -judgment. 
Plaintiff, as a pro se litigant, raises or attempts to raise a number of "shadow issues" having to 
do with her complaints about her divorce case (in which defendant represented plaintiff as 
plaintiffs counsel), or about the judicial system in general. However, these are issues wholly 
unrelated to the matter at hand. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
This appeal arises out of the trial court granting the defendant's motion for summary 
judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The standard contained 
within that Rule is that a court may not grant a motion for summary judgment absent a showing 
that there is no substantial issue of material fact in the case, and that the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. Upon review of a grant of motion for summary judgment, this 
Court must apply the same standard as that of applied by the trial court. Durham v. Margetts. 
571 P.2d 1332 (Utah, 1977). Because disposition of a case on summary judgment denies the 
benefit of a trial on the merits, the appellate court must review the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the losing party (plaintiff), and must affirm only where it appears that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material issue of fact, or where, even according to the facts as 
contended by the losing party, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Copper 
State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance and Furniture Co.. 770 P.2d 88 (Utah, 1988); Hunt v. 
E.S.I. Engineering. Inc.. 808 P.2d 1137 (Ut. App.) cert, den., 826 P.2d 651 (Utah, 1991). 
Since a summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, the appellate court is free to review the 
trial courts legal conclusions. Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah, 1991). 
3 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The addendum to this brief contains the text of Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which is the relevant Rule in this matter. Further, defendant asserts the holdings in 
Harline v. Barker. 854 P.2d 595 (Ut.App., 1993); and Hall v. Fitzgerald. 671 P.2d 224 (Utah, 
1983) are dispositive. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action is a claim of professional negligence ("malpractice") filed in the court below 
in October of 1995. (R.O.A., 1-55) After answering the plaintiffs complaint, defendant filed 
a motion for summary judgment, (R.O.A., 66) and filed various affidavits with the trial court 
in support of the motion for summary judgment. (R.O.A., 93-97; 98-105; and 201-203) 
Plaintiff failed to file any responsive affidavits to the motion for summary judgment, 
though she did file an unverified pleading entitled "Response to Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Memorandum in Support [sic] of that Motion." (R.O.A., 106-191) 
The matter came before the court for hearing upon the defendant's motion for summary 
judgment. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. That judgment 
was entered in the lower court on February 2, 1996. (R.O.A., 239-241) No post-trial motions 
were filed. 
From the summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff filed an untimely 
notice of appeal on March 5, 1996. (R.O.A., 244) 
4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff retained defendant and defendant's law firm to represent plaintiff in a 
divorce proceeding filed in the Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
That divorce proceeding was complicated by the fact that plaintiff's former husband had 
previously been convicted of attempted sexual exploitation of a minor for conduct against his 
daughter. 
2. The divorce proceeding between the Fishers was eventually resolved by a 
stipulation in the District Court, to which the plaintiff herein agreed, resolving all issues 
including custody, supervised visitation, child support, alimony, property distribution and debt 
distribution. Upon the conclusion of the case, defendant herein withdrew as counsel for 
Plaintiff. 
3. Subsequent to the withdrawal of Defendant as counsel for Plaintiff, Plaintiff 
initiated a complaint with the Utah State Bar, which is referenced in the plaintiff's complaint in 
the trial court. (R.O. A., 2) The Utah State Bar found no basis to pursue any disciplinary action 
against Defendant arising out of her representation of Plaintiff. (R.O.A., 2) 
4. Defendant achieved an excellent result for the plaintiff in the plaintiffs divorce 
proceeding. (R.O. A., 98-105) In that divorce proceeding, plaintiff here obtained over one-half 
the financial value of the marital assets, net of marital debt. Plaintiff obtained an award of child 
support strictly in conformity with the Utah uniform child support guidelines. Plaintiff obtained 
sole custody of her children, subject to very restrictive rights of visitation on the part of her 
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former husband. Plaintiff obtained an award of $1.00 per year alimony, despite the fact that Mr. 
Fisher's income was about one-half plaintiff's income. (R.O.A., 074) 
5. Any delay in the underlying divorce proceeding, or any inability on the part of 
plaintiff's divorce counsel to establish a need for more restrictive visitation or a termination of 
visitation, were impeded by the plaintiffs personal delays of the proceedings, by the plaintiff's 
irrational behavior in the presence of the trial court in the divorce case, and by the plaintiff's 
alienation of her children's therapists, and their subsequent unwillingness to cooperate in 
terminating visitation. (R.O.A., 93-97; and 201-203) 
6. Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant for professional negligence in the trial 
court. Thereafter, the matter was reviewed by Mr. Bert L. Dart, Jr., (hereinafter "Dart") as an 
expert witness to assess the performance of the defendant in the underlying divorce proceedings. 
Dart reviewed the matter and found the defendant's performance to be well within the standard 
of care for a professional practicing in a contested divorce proceeding within the state of Utah. 
Further, Dart found that the plaintiff suffered no damages as a result of the defendant's 
representation, in any event, because the results obtained in the divorce proceeding were highly 
satisfactory to plaintiff. Defendant's expert, Dart, filed an affidavit to this effect with the trial 
court in support of the motion for summary judgment. (R.O.A., 98-105) 
7. Plaintiff never submitted the opinion of any expert or potential expert, sworn or 
unsworn, to support her claims that the defendant had been negligent in the exercise of her 
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professional duties in the plaintiffs divorce. She never submitted any affidavits in the trial court 
in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. 
8. The matter came before the court for hearing upon the motion for summary 
judgment, which was granted in favor of the defendant. Plaintiffs complaint was dismissed with 
prejudice. From that dismissal, plaintiff filed an untimely notice of appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court acted properly in granting the motion for summary judgment. There were 
no affidavits whatsoever in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. More importantly, 
there were no affidavits from expert witnesses, or even unsworn reports from expert witnesses, 
willing to testify that defendant had committed professional negligence in her representation of 
plaintiff in the plaintiffs divorce proceeding. 
In order to have defeated the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff 
would have had to show a genuine issue for trial. She could not rest upon mere allegations or 
denials in her pleadings. Hall v. Fitzgerald. 671 P.2d 224 (Utah, 1983). Without a showing 
of a breach of duty, there was no issue for trial, and summary judgment was appropriate. 
Moreover, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff failed to file her 
notice of appeal timely and because she failed to pay the filing fee and cost bond on appeal 
without good cause. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. THE APPEAL HEREIN WAS UNTIMELY. 
As noted above, the final judgment and order appealed from in this case was entered in 
the trial court on February 2, 1996. The notice of appeal was not filed in this matter until 
March 5, 1996. The notice of appeal had to be filed, ip order to confer jurisdiction upon this 
Court, within thirty days, or by March 4, 1996. (Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure., Rule 
4(a)) Because the notice of appeal is untimely in this matter, the Court lacks jurisdiction to 
consider the appeal, and the appeal should be dismissed. The trial court order should, therefore, 
stand. 
Plaintiff complains, with regard to this issue, that she attempted timely to file the notice 
of appeal in the trial court, but that the trial court clerk's office did not cooperate with her 
adequately to notarize her affidavit of impecuniosity, that she did not have the proper documents 
to file her appeal, and that she was therefore forced to file the notice of appeal in the trial court 
"after hours" filing box. Her failure to come to court with proper documents in time to have 
the notice of appeal entered March 4, 1996, is not an excuse for the untimely filing. 
The requirements of Rule 4 are jurisdictional and cannot be waived. Glezos v. Frontier 
Inc.. 896 P.2d 1230 (Ut.Ct.App., 1995). 
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POINT 2. THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION DUE TO THE IMPROPER 
FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEES AND A COST BOND. 
Plaintiff is pursuing this appeal pursuant to the filing of an affidavit of impecuniosity in 
the trial court at the time of filing her notice of appeal. Her affidavit of impecuniosity contains 
a general statement that she is impecunious and unable to pay the filing fee or cost bond on 
appeal. However, she offers no specific financial information to this Court. 
In subsequent motions to this Court, defendant has asserted that the plaintiff has 
substantial assets awarded to her in the decree of divorce, including real estate and her own 
wages. Despite these challenges to the plaintiffs affidavit of impecuniosity, the plaintiff has 
never filed a financial statement with this Court verifying her right to proceed impecuniously. 
Rule 3(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, mandates the filing of fees 
established by law for the docketing of the appeal, and requires that the clerk of the trial court 
"shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing and docketing fees are paid." 
The requirement that filing and docketing fees be paid is jurisdictional in a case. Where 
the filing and docketing fees are not timely paid, the notice of appeal is untimely and the 
appellate court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal. McLain v. Conrad. 431 P.2d 5712 (Utah, 
1967). 
Further, pursuant to Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure, and appellant must 
file a cost bond in the sum of at least $300.00, to insure payment of costs on appeal. The 
requirements of Rule 6 are mandatory. 
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This Court should not permit the plaintiff to avoid all costs to her of pursuing this 
frivolous appeal by the filing of an equally frivolous and unfounded affidavit of impecuniosity. 
This Court should mandate that the plaintiff establish for the court verified information regarding 
her financial circumstances, and if she is found to be proceeding inappropriately on the basis of 
an affidavit of impecuniosity, her appeal should be dismissed as untimely, for the untimely 
payment of costs and a bond on appeal. 
POINT 3, SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATE IN THE TRIAL 
COURT, SINCE THERE WAS NO MATERIAL ISSUE OF LAW 
OR FACT IN DISPUTE. 
A. Plaintiff cannot make out the elements of the tort claimed, as a 
matter of law. 
In order to prevail in an attorney malpractice case, a plaintiff must demonstrate the 
existence of four elements. They are: 1) an attorney/client relationship; 2) a duty of care owed 
to the client by the attorney; 3) a breach of that duty of care; and 4) that the attorney's breach 
proximately caused the plaintiffs damages. Bruer-Harrison. Inc. v. Combe. 799 P.2d 716 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). To avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff must establish some competent 
evidence to support each element of her professional malpractice claim. Harline v. Barker, 854 
P.2d595 (Ut.App., 1993). 
Defendant agrees that both elements one and two are met, but strenuously disagrees that 
she breached the duty of care owed to the plaintiff, and/or that the plaintiff suffered any 
damages. Defendant represented the plaintiff through a difficult divorce case. Plaintiffs former 
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husband was convicted of felony child sex abuse. Due to his criminal conviction, his earning 
potential was greatly reduced. Under these difficult circumstances, defendant zealously 
represented the plaintiff and insured that the plaintiff was awarded sole custody of the children. 
Her former husband1 s visitation was severely restricted. Plaintiff received one-half the marital 
estate, including all equity in the marital residence, and the family automobile free and clear of 
any claim by the defendant. 
The plaintiff here stipulated to the terms of the settlement, which was a very favorable 
result. She could not have received a better result if the case had been tried. 
Defendant did not breach the duty she owed to plaintiff. Further, plaintiff cannot 
demonstrate any damages. Therefore, summary judgment was appropriate. 
Dart, a domestic law practitioner with significant experience who would qualify as an 
expert if called at trial, reviewed this matter and found no breach of duty of care by defendant. 
He found no damages had occurred to plaintiff. Plaintiff was therefore wholly unable to support 
a case for legal malpractice in the trial court. 
Plaintiff herself admitted at the hearing below that the sole basis for her case is that she 
is personally unhappy with what defendant did, and is not satisfied with Dart's explanation of 
what defendant did. (Tr. 1/22/06, p. 13,1.17-p. 14,1.3) 
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B. Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no material 
issues of law or fact in dispute. 
In order to defeat the defendants motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must show 
that there is a genuine issue for trial. She cannot merely rest upon the allegations or denials in 
her pleadings. Hall v. Fitzgerald, supra. Without a showing of a breach of duty of care, there 
is no issue for trial, and summary judgment is mandated. Without a showing of damages, there 
is likewise no issue for trial. 
A simple review of the affidavit of Dart, filed in support of the defendant's motion for 
summary judgment in the trial court, leads to only one conclusion - - that there was no breach 
of duty of care owed by defendant to plaintiff and that there was therefore no issue for trial. 
Further, there were no damages to plaintiff in any event, and thus, no issue for trial. 
POINT 4. ISSUES UNRELATED TO THE APPEAL SHOULD NOT BE 
CONSIDERED. 
The plaintiff is a pro se party. In much of her brief, she attempts to distract this Court 
away from the only issue (whether the trial court committed an error of law in granting summary 
judgment) and urges this Court to consider the underlying merits of her tort claim, or even the 
underlying merits of her divorce proceeding. This Court should decline the invitation in the 
plaintiffs brief to address these issues, which are irrelevant in this appeal. 
For example, in paragraph 3 of her "Issues Presented For Review," the plaintiff attempts 
to raise a question of "first impression" in the State of Utah; namely, how trial courts should 
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handle domestic violence and child sex abuse cases in the context of a divorce proceeding. This 
is a broad social issue, not preserved as an issue on appeal, and having nothing to do with the 
summary judgment in question. 
Similarly, in paragraph 4 of the "Issues Presented For Review" also plaintiff invites this 
Court to address questions of "progressive recollection" and disclosure of abuse by a child 
victim, of whether there should be some rebuttable in the context of the best interest standards 
pertaining to visitation and custody in abuse cases, and whether there should be a presumption 
in favor of termination of all contact between the abuse perpetrator and children in the family. 
Again, this raises a broad social and policy issue absolutely unpreserved in the trial court for 
review in this appeal, having nothing to do whatsoever with the matter at hand. 
In paragraph 5 of her "Issues Presented For Review," plaintiff suggests that this Court 
should consider the underlying merits of the tort claim. It invites this Court to consider 
defendant's conduct in reference to supposed information available from the Intermountain Sexual 
Abuse Treatment Center, offender treatment programs, and the management of child sex abuse 
cases in the context of divorce proceedings. Again, this is wholly irrelevant to the appeal. 
Finally, in paragraph 6 of her "Issues Presented for Review," plaintiff invites this Court 
to question a matter of "first impression" regarding cross-over issues between civil and criminal 
actions when child sex abuse occurs. Again, this has nothing whatsoever to do with this appeal, 
and raises issues not preserved in any manner in the trial court. 
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Plaintiffs "Statement of Facts" in her brief sets forth numerous "facts" totally 
unsupported in the record and irrelevant for consideration of this appeal. These "facts" pertain 
to the defendant's supposed management of plaintiffs underlying divorce case, and purport to 
set forth the basis of plaintiffs tort claim. None of these "facts" are actually supported by any 
testimony or affidavit in the trial court record. 
At page 21, paragraph 22, of her brief, the plaintiff makes quick reference to her "issues 
3, 4, 5, and 6" which are cited summarily in her "Issues Presented for Review," but for which 
plaintiff provides no further argument. As to these issues, they are irrelevant in this appeal. 
Plaintiff wholly fails to marshall any evidence in support of these appellate claims. In Hodges 
v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court stated, "it is 
not the duty of the appellate court in a civil case to canvas the record on its own to determine 
the sufficiency of the evidence." Further, she fails to establish that any of these appellate claims 
were preserved on the record (which they were not). For this reason, the Court should refuse 
to consider any issue except the granting of the summary judgment itself. 
POINT 5. DEFENDANT SHOULD BE AWARDED HER COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL. 
The appeal in this matter is untimely. The underlying action is frivolous and the appeal 
is frivolous. Defendant should be awarded a judgment for her attorney's fees incurred in this 
appeal against the plaintiff, in an amount to be determined by the Court. An award of court 
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costs and attorney's fees incurred in this appeal is authorized pursuant to Rule 34 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Specifically, under Rule 33, attorney's fees may be awarded for to the prevailing party for a 
frivolous appeal, which is defined as one " . . . not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing 
law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law." This 
describes exactly the nature of the appeal in this case, and is the basis for an award of attorney's 
fees to defendant. This appeal is, in fact, an effort by a litigant, acting pro se, to perpetuate the 
acrimony of her divorce case, and it should be sanctioned as such. Porco v. Porco. 752 P.2d 
365 (Ut.Ct.App., 1988), and Maughan v. Maughan. 770 P.2d 156 (Ut.Ct.App., 1989). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should conclude that it lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction herein, due to the untimely filing of the appeal, and the unlawful failure to pay the 
filing fee and cost bond on appeal. Further, the Court should hold that summary judgment was 
appropriate in the trial court for two reasons: 1) there was no substantial issue as to the 
plaintiff's ability to prove a breach of duty of care on the part of the defendant; and 2) there was 
no substantial issue as to question of whether plaintiff had suffered damages as a result of the 
defendant's conduct. 
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Because there was no substantial issue of any fact whatsoever in the trial court, summary 
judgment was mandated. The summary judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Defendant should be awarded her costs and attorney fees in responding to this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _«2£^day of August, 1996. 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
CARMAN &$L?\ 
GREGORY J. SANDERS 
Attorneys for Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I caused the foregoing Brief of Appellee, to be 
mailed, postage pre-paid, by placing two true and correct copies of the same in an envelope 
addressed to: 
PAULA FISHER 
Plaintiff/Appellant Pro Se 
P.O. Box 65464 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84165-0464 
on the gfl^day of Q u q u A J r , 1996. 
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153 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE R u l e 56 
with our declared policy that in case of uncer-
tainty, default judgments should be set aside to 
allow trial on the merits. Locke v. Peterson, 3 
Utah 2d 415, 285 P.2d 1111 (1955). 
Default judgment and writ of garnishment 
were properly set aside where trial court failed 
to obtain jurisdiction over defendant because 
summons was not timely issued. Fibreboard 
Paper Prods. Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65, 
475 P.2d 1005 (1970). 
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action, 
promptly objected to date set for trial on the 
ground that their counsel had an already 
scheduled appearance in another court on that 
date, but due to fact that there were no law or 
motion days between time objection was filed 
and trial date, objection was never heard, re-
fusal to set aside default judgment entered 
when appellants failed to appear on trial date 
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Ham-
mem, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). 
Time for appeal. 
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal 
from a default judgment in a dry court ran 
from the date of notice of entry of such judg-
ment, rather than from the date of judgment. 
Buckner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co,, 4 Utah 2d 
124, 288 P.2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d)). 
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. 
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965); 
J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P^d 486 
(Utah 1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P^d 92 (Utah 
1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Opening default or default judgment claimed 
to have been obtained because of attorney's 
mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 AXJt3d 
1255. 
Failure to give notice of application for de-
fault judgment where notice is required only 
by custom, 28 AX.R.3d 1383. 
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
pretrial conference, 55 AX.R.3d 303. 
Default judgments against the United States 
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rates of Civil 
Procedure, 55 AX.R Fed. 190. 
Key Numbers. — Judgment e» 92 to 134. 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason-* 
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Gra-
ham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937. 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments 
§ 265 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218. 
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to lia-
bility against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d 
1070. 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus-
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d 
1272. 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam-
ages, 15 A.L.R3d 586. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-clain or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facta are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
8hall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
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stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
Rule 56, FJtCP. §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
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 # -Contract interpretation. 
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-Waiver of right to contest.
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-When unavailable
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Exclusive control of facta. Motion to dismiss. 
—Who may make. Motion to reconsider. 
Affirmative defense. Notice. 
Answers to interrogatories. —Provision not jurisdictional. 
Appeal. —Waiver of defect. 
—Adversely affected party. Procedural due process. 
—Standard of review. Purpose. 
Attorney's fees. Scope. 
Availability of motion. Summary judgment improper. 
Compliance with rule. —Damage to insured vehicle. 
Cross-motions. —Dispersal of interest. 
Damages. —Findings by court. 
